IEC TR 63415:2023 PDF

Overview

IEC TR 63415:2023 - "Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems - Use of formal security models for I&C security architecture design and assessment" - provides guidance for formally modelling and designing cyber‑secure I&C architectures at nuclear power plants (NPPs). The technical report describes a model‑based approach to support plant‑specific risk assessment and to synthesize I&C architectures that meet cybersecurity requirements for safety‑critical systems.

Key Topics

• Integrated security modelling (ICM): guidance for creating a comprehensive security model that combines an information exchange model (DM) and a security model (SLM).
• Asset classification and clustering: formal techniques to rank, group and order I&C assets based on properties relevant to security.
• Security degree assignment: model‑based methods to assign security degrees to assets and to verify conformance between data flows and security requirements.
• Barrier measures and zone boundaries: assignment of protective measures and definition of security zones to contain threats and control information exchange.
• Information transfer requirements: specification of security requirements for data exchange between I&C components, operators and external systems.
• Secure‑by‑design principles: guidance to increase determinism in system designs to enhance cybersecurity in I&C architectures.
• Procedure and case study: step‑by‑step procedure for I&C security modelling, supported by a practical case study and algorithmic considerations (informative annexes).
• Simulation and assessment: concepts for using simulation (digital twin / stress tests) to validate and assess security architectures.

Applications

IEC TR 63415:2023 is intended to be used during the I&C system security life cycle to:

• Inform architecture synthesis for new or modified I&C systems.
• Support plant‑specific risk assessments by translating risk insights into modelled security requirements.
• Define secure information exchanges and map security requirements into the I&C design.
• Determine security zoning and protective measures based on formal analysis of assets and flows.
• Validate architecture changes through model analysis and simulation.

Who should use this standard

• I&C system architects and designers for NPPs
• Cybersecurity engineers and analysts working on nuclear I&C protection
• Safety and risk assessment teams performing plant‑specific evaluations
• Regulators and technical reviewers assessing I&C security architectures

Related standards

Use IEC TR 63415 alongside other IEC nuclear I&C and cybersecurity publications applicable to NPP instrumentation and control. Consult the IEC Webstore and committee TC45 guidance for complementary normative standards and implementation references.